-1 -
3UREDELOLW\ DQG QHFHVVLW\ LQ (QJOLVK DQG *HUPDQ 5DSKDHO 6DONLH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI %ULJKWRQ (QJODQG
If we see a man carrying a particular kind of black bag we may say "He must be a doctor", i.e. we assume a cause (being a doctor) behind the fact observed (carrying a black bag). We may then say "He should be able to help us", i.e. we deduce a consequence (possibility of help) from the fact observed (or rather, supposed). Gailor (1983: 346) "Soll" has no clear meaning in German (more like "muß" or "sollte" or somewhere in between?). To prevent misunderstandings, the use of "soll" should be avoided in standards. "should" must always be translated by "sollte" and "shall" by "muß". (Kommission Arbeitsschutz und Normung, 1999) .
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Despite an abundance of research into English modal verbs, several key issues remain unresolved:
x Firstly, do modals have a single underlying meaning, or should they be treated as polysemous? x Secondly, in analysing the diverse uses of modals how much weight should be given to semantics and how much to pragmatics? These two questions are connected, since analysts who argue that modals are monosemous typically give a greater burden to pragmatic factors. x Thirdly, what kind of general framework for analysing modality can best be applied to the use of modals in particular languages such as English?
Studies of modality have hitherto tended either to focus on one language in detail (see below for some examples), or to take a broader typological approach (for instance, Palmer (2001)). With monolingual studies a major problem is whether the analytical frameworks proposed only work for one language, or whether they can be generalised across languages. Broader studies tend to be at a level of generality which makes it hard to use them in helping to answer the questions in the previous paragraph. This leaves a gap which can perhaps be filled by contrastive studies of modality in two languages. By taking the most successful monolingual studies of one language and attempting to apply them to another language, we can subject them to a new type of scrutiny. We will then perhaps be able to propose a framework for modality which combines the detailed empirical coverage of monolingual analyses with the cross-linguistic validity of broader studies.
The research reported on in this paper adopts this contrastive strategy for modals in English and German. The plan is as follows:
1. Take the most promising studies of English modals, and try to apply the analyses to German translation equivalents.
-2 -2. Take the most promising studies of German modals and try to apply the analyses to English translation equivalents. 3.
Compare the two sets of translation equivalents, and the various studies of modals, with untranslated examples of modals in the target languages.
This paper limits itself to the first of these steps, using the INTERSECT translation corpus described in Salkie & Oates (1999) . Only the modals of necessity -SHOULD and MUST -will be considered in any detail.
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One of the strongest analyses of English modals is Groefsema (1995) . In relation to our first key issue above, Groefsema argues at length that the four modals MAY, CAN, MUST and SHOULD each has a single basic meaning. On the second issue she ascribes great importance to pragmatics, drawing on an explicit theory -Relevance Theory -within which her analyses are situated. She does not address the third issue, a weakness that we hope to remedy within the research reported on here.
Groefsema assigns these modals the meanings indicated informally in the following table, where P is the proposition minus the modal:
P is compatible with some of the relevant evidence. P is compatible with all the relevant evidence. P is entailed by some of the relevant evidence. P is entailed by all the relevant evidence.
The "evidence" can be textual or taken from the non-linguistic context. Although the term "evidence" may make it appear that the analysis is tailor-made to handle epistemic uses of modals, it is intended to cover all the uses of each modal, including deontic ones. Take an example like (1), uttered by a mother to her son who is going to a party (Groefsema 1995: 70) :
(1) You must be home by eleven.
The most relevant evidence for P ("The son be home by eleven") in this situation is the son's assumption that his mother has authority over him. The deontic interpretation is therefore likely to be the preferred one for this utterance. Groefsema argues that the equivalent sentence with SHOULD would be "less imperative", because the mother would merely be saying that there is some evidence which entails P, rather than that all the evidence entails P.
Another framework for analysing English modals is proposed in Larreya & Rivière (1999) (see also Larreya 1999 Subjective possibility, proceeding from the pQRQFLDWHXU (speaker). Neutral possibility, independent of the pQRQFLDWHXU (speaker).
[SHALL] Necessary consequence, presented as subjective.
[PAST TENSE] Implicit non-reality. Quasi-absolute necessity, presented as subjective.
The term pQRQFLDWHXU has been rendered as "speaker" here: strictly speaking the term has a wider and more abstract sense, but these complications are not relevant to the issues discussed in this paper. The terms "subjective" and "neutral" are said by Larreya & Rivière to cut across the entire system of modals and semi-modals in English:
There is, in the modal system, a key opposition "neutral" / "subjective". The claim in the table above is that CAN is always neutral, while the other three modals are always subjective. A further key feature of this system is that (as is common in French analyses of English), SHOULD is treated as a combination of SHALL and the past tense morpheme, whereas Groefsema does not refer to SHALL and treats SHOULD as a single item.
The specific analysis of SHALL proposed by Larreya & Rivière is motivated in part by contrasts between SHALL and WILL: for WILL, they propose the same notion of "necessary consequence", but this time presented as neutral. The claim is that a sentence containing WILL always involves an implication from something else. Consider these examples:
(2) Fred won't answer any questions. (3) He'll be at home at this time of day. (4) This sofa will seat five people without any problem. (5) I think it'll rain tomorrow.
In (2) the implication is from Fred's will; in (3) from a set of known facts; in (4) from other properties of the sofa; and in (5), the straightforward future time use of WILL, we have a -4 -prediction which may be an implication from a set of known facts. 3 With SHALL, on the other hand, Larreya & Rivière claim that the implication is always from a personal opinion, willingness or wish. Thus we get the contrast between (6) and (7): (6) What shall I do? (7) What will I do?
In (6) the question asks about the will of the hearer, whereas (7) is neutral about the source of the prediction.
For SHOULD, Larreya & Rivière distinguish the following main uses:
(8) I should deplore it enormously if you left. (9) Should you need to make a claim, ring our 24-hour hotline. (10) I should give up smoking. (11) Fred should be home by now (12) She suggested that he should go. (13) It's surprising that he should be at home.
In all these cases the past tense morpheme -ED does not express past-time but is a "modal preterite", expressing "implicit non-reality" of the event in question. For (10), in the straightforward deontic interpretation, the effect of the past tense is to weaken the obligation ("le prétérit affaiblit l'obligation" - Larreya & Rivière (1999: 110) ). Similarly, in cases like (11), Larreya & Rivière say that the logical necessity is weakened ("nécessité logique affaiblie" -1999: 110). Notice a clear difference here from Groefsema's analysis: she argues that with SHOULD the relation between evidence and the proposition is still the strong one of entailment -the weakening (when compared with MUST) is said to be in the amount of relevant evidence, not in the entailment relationship. Larreya & Rivière, on the other hand, claim that the relation itself is weaker.
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To examine the differences between SHOULD and MUST more carefully, it is useful to consider some data discussed in Rivière (1981) , which concentrates on the probability / logical inference uses exemplified here: Rivière argues that the inference from the first clause to the second in these examples can be strengthened or weakened in two ways, as shown in the table below. The term "cause" -5 -is to be understood in the looser sense of "enabling element": thus in (14-17), living in Oxford enables the hearer to know Professor Fen, and in (18/19) John's being brilliant makes it possible for him to pass his exam.
)DFWRUV WKDW 675(1*7+(1 DQ LQIHUHQFH Larreya & Rivière (1999) , where MUST is characterised as quasiabsolute necessity, falling just short of clear certainty, whereas SHOULD involves a weakened form of necessity because of the past tense morpheme that it contains.
In Salkie (1996) I argued that Rivière's explanation in terms of strengthening and weakening factors is inadequate. The underlying principle in his account is that SHOULD is too "weak" to occur in certain contexts, while MUST is too "strong" to occur in others. Notice, however, that MAY is perfectly acceptable in all of (14-19): the meaning changes from necessity to possibility, of course, but that is not the point. If probability / logical inference SHOULD is not possible in (17) because it is too weak, then D IRUWLRUL MAY, which is "weaker" on a scale of certainty, should be impossible too. This suggests that it is some other aspect of the meaning of SHOULD which determines its behaviour in (17).
A further problem for Rivière is that his combinations of strengthening factors are incomplete. He gives three pairs of examples: (16-17) with both strengthening factors, (18-19) with neither, and (14-15) with just one. The strengthening factor in (14-15) is the second one (the inferred event takes place in the past or the present). That leaves out a fourth case, however, in which the single strengthening factor is the first one (the speaker asserts the consequence and infers the cause): we need to put the inferred event in the future in order to eliminate the second strengthening factor. Examples like (20-21) meet these conditions:
(20) You know Professor Fen, you should recognise him when he arrives then.
(21) *You know Professor Fen, you must recognise him when he arrives then.
Rivière's analysis predicts that both of these are fine, but in fact probability / logical inference MUST is not possible in (21). This suggests that the inability of MUST to refer to the future is not because future events are too uncertain, but is due to some other aspect of the meaning of MUST.
To summarise, the basic fact which any account of SHOULD and MUST has to capture is that in contexts where both modals are possible, MUST expresses a stronger degree of -6 -probability or necessity. In some contexts, however, only one modal is possible. These are as follows:
A. MUST is not normally used to make an inference about a future event , whereas SHOULD can be used to predict the future consequences of a present state of affairs. (18-19) . B. SHOULD is not used to infer a cause from a consequence (17). C. Only SHOULD can be used as a more formal counterpart of WOULD (cf. (8)). D. SHOULD can be used "directively" in subordinate clauses with verbs that impose an obligation (e.g. 12), or verbs which express an attitude to the situation which is stated in the subordinate clause and presupposed as true ("appreciatively") (13). E. In formal register, SHOULD can be used in the protasis of certain types of unreal conditional (cf. (9)).
Before we assess the two frameworks on their success in capturing these facts, let us turn to data from the translation corpus.
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The INTERSECT corpus contains 440 examples of MUST and 355 of SHOULD. To make comparison easier a random sample of 100 examples for each word was produced, and the equivalents analysed. 4 Here are some examples of different equivalents; the number in brackets after each heading is the number of instances in the sample, and the code after each pair of examples is explained at the end of this paper: 'LVFXVVLRQ
The distribution of equivalents of MUST suggests that MUST and MÜSSEN are basically equivalent. The examples using IST…ZU are no surprise as this construction is commonly used in German for instructions, and out of a hundred examples we would expect to find a handful where German for one reason or another does not use a modal verb, as in (30-3). Examples like (27) with DÜRFEN and a negative expression, however, should make us pause: they reflect the fact that when MÜSSEN is used in the negative, it is the modality which is negated, whereas with MUST it is the proposition. This is a problem if we want to transfer Groefsema's analysis of MUST to German, since she argues that the scope of negation with MUST follows automatically from her semantic analysis (1995: 74-6 ). In this case, then, a contrastive approach has produced an outcome that would not be possible in a monolingual analysis: although we might want to say that MUST and MÜSSEN have the same semantics, Groefsema's proposal does not seem to work for MÜSSEN.
The correspondences between English and German are less clear with SHOULD than with MUST. Although forms of the modal verb SOLLEN predominate, they only account for 56% of our sample. In the obligation sense, as in examples (35) For the probability / logical inference sense of SHOULD, which is less common in the sample, the present tense of SOLLEN is used almost exclusively: example (37) is the only one where SOLLTE is used, and even here the sense is not definitely probability / logical inference. The contrasts between English and German here are perhaps easier to handle in a framework like Groefsema's, where SHOULD is not analysed as SHALL + past tense. In the analysis of Larreya & Rivière, on the other hand, it is natural to try to capture the parallel between English SHALL + past tense and German SOLLEN + past tense. The parallel seems to break down, however, since German can use SOLLEN in many cases without a past tense to correspond to SHOULD. In addition, it is hardly plausible to propose that SOLLEN and SHALL have the same basic meaning: out of 100 instances of SHALL in the corpus, only 10 were translated using a form of SOLLEN, and these were restricted to archaic and legalistic uses such as this one:
64. They [[shall] ] elect their priests (sacerdotes) freely and introduce the elected (to the bishop). 65. Sie sollen ihre Pfarrer (sacerdotes) frei wählen und die Gewählten (dem Bischof)
vorstellen.
[MISC\SIEBS]
The fact that only just over half of the instances of SHOULD correspond to SOLLEN also argues against assigning them a parallel analysis. It appears, then, that the meaning of SOLLEN overlaps to some extent with that of SHOULD, but not to such an extent that we can transfer Larreya & Rivière's framework to German. Before concluding in favour of Groefsema, however, we should note that a partial overlap of meaning is hard to formulate within her framework, which analyses SHOULD as "P is entailed by some of the relevant evidence". It is unclear which parts of this analysis can be applied to SOLLEN.
Further problems for both frameworks arise if we look at the other German equivalents of SHOULD in (42-61). We would perhaps expect a wider range of miscellaneous equivalents for SHOULD than for MUST, since with SHOULD the certainty or the obligation is less strong than with MUST, and a language will probably have a range of ways of signalling this weakening, as we see in (51), (57), (59) As for the other uses of SHOULD illustrated in (42-61), these appear somewhat intractable for Groefsema, since they have no apparent connection with the notion of "entailment by some of the relevant evidence" that she proposes. Since SHOULD is not translated by SOLLEN in these other uses, it would appear that SOLLEN has a more precise and limited sense than SHOULD, with its range of different uses. Thus an analysis like Groefsema's which proposes a very specific sense for SHOULD looks less plausible when faced with contrastive evidence. As for Larreya & Rivière, they discuss some of these other uses in their discussion of SHOULD (1999: 107-12) but do not show how they follow from the basic sense that they propose. To take one of these uses, we can see from (53) that a crosslinguistic account of "directives" needs to involve an analysis of the Konjunktiv (subjunctive) in German. Nobody, though, has ever proposed that the subjunctive should be analysed as "necessary consequence, presented as subjective" plus "implicit nonreality": though the latter formulation is perhaps relevant to an account of the German subjunctive, recall that this is supposed to be expressed by the past tense in English, not by SHOULD.
Let us now return to the other facts about SHOULD and MUST listed in section 2 above, in the light of contrastive data where possible. The fact that epistemic MUST cannot refer to the future is analysed by Groefsema as following automatically from its meaning: she argues that MUST involves all the relevant evidence, and that one can never have all the evidence to entail an event in the future (1995: 72). As we have seen in (23), German MÜSSEN can be used epistemically in a similar way to MUST, but MÜSSEN can refer to the future, as in this example:
68. Aber Bester, schnaufen Sie nicht so stark, oder die Bienen und Schmetterlinge [[müssen] ] verhungern über den ungeheuren Prisen, die Sie aus den Blumen ziehen. 69. But, my dear fellow, do not snort so. Your monstrous sniffing will empty the flowers, and the bees and the butterflies will starve. [FICTION\GERFICT] Notice that the English translator avoids using MUST here, perhaps because of the restriction on using epistemic MUST for the future. Again, this casts doubt on the ability of Groefsema's framework to be extended beyond English.
Groefsema also argues (1995: 68) that the subjective part of deontic MUST also derives from the fact that it refers to all the evidence -including the will of the speaker. She contrasts this with HAVE TO, which does not have this subjective element. Apart from the fact that she does not indicate what the basic sense of HAVE TO might be, this leaves Groefsema no way to account for the subjective element in the meaning of SHOULD, which Larreya & Rivière rightly allude to (in contrast with OUGHT TO). A general conclusion about Groefsema, then, is that her analysis of MUST in terms of "all the relevant evidence" tries to make too much of the behaviour of MUST follow from the word "all".
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The main problem with Larreya & Rivière, on the other hand, is the way they treat certain modals as always subjective and others as always neutral. Although this distinction is surely needed somewhere within a framework for analysing modality, it cannot be transferred directly to German: the simple fact that we have found just about every German modal just in translation equivalents of SHOULD and MUST argues against simply saying that certain German modals are always subjective and others always neutral. This in turn casts doubt on the way they use the distinction for English.
Let us return finally to Rivière's problem, the key sentence in which is (17), repeated here: Rivière notes that in this example, the speaker asserts the consequence and infers the cause, a stronger inference than one from cause to consequence. Both the frameworks discussed here capture the way in which SHOULD is "weaker" than MUST, but neither of them can explain why the inference is (17) is too strong to allow probability / logical inference SHOULD -especially as MAY is perfectly possible here. The conclusion, it seems, is that any attempt to treat SHOULD and MUST in a similar way is misconceived, since SHOULD does not have straightforward epistemic uses in the way that MUST and MAY do. Instead, SHOULD has to be treated as standing outside the core modal system. This conclusion is more in the spirit of Larreya & Rivière than of Groefsema, who tries to find a place for SHOULD in a neat system. The framework of Larreya & Rivière is less systematic, but if we are right then that is an advantage in dealing with the English facts, and probably for cross-linguistic purposes too.
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We have found that a contrastive approach poses a severe test for monolingual analyses of English modals. By taking two frameworks proposed for English, and then trying to apply them to German data, we have highlighted strengths and weaknesses of each framework in new ways. We tentatively concluded that the analysis of Larreya & Rivière had fewer disadvantages than that of Groefsema, though both have problems in handling some of the German equivalents of SHOULD, and neither framework solved what we have called "Rivière's problem".
In future work we shall apply the contrastive approach in the opposite direction, and look at other modals and other theoretical frameworks. Although the goal of a rigorous, crosslinguistically valid framework for modality remains elusive, we hope that the value of a contrastive approach has been demonstrated.
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